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Intercompany Pricing of Intangibles Under
Section 482: A Comparison with

Japanese Tax Policy
By CHRISTINE TOMOMATSU
Member of the Class of 1990

I.

INTRODUCTION

Business has become increasingly international rather than local in
focus. The international policies of the United States must be considered
carefully because they affect United States international trading partners
and, more importantly, the vitality of the American economy. Tax policy has a powerful influence on the United States economy. A tax change
may seem harmless, but because of its pervasive effect, one change can
unexpectedly impact the economy. For example, taxes can discourage
international activities which in the long run, may be detrimental to the
United States economic growth. Taxes can affect the competitiveness of
United States corporations and ultimately the United States balance of
trade. The United States inability to reduce its current trade deficit could
indicate a weakness in the ability of American-made products to compete
with products of international competitors.
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code gives the Secretary of the
Treasury the authority to allocate income and expenses between related
entities to prevent evasion of taxes or to better reflect income.' The 1986
Tax Reform Act amended section 482 with a simple, one sentence addition which states that the income from transfers of intangible property
between related entities shall be "commensurate with the income attributable to that intangible. ' ' 2 Prior to this amendment, the IRS applied an
arm's length standard to intangibles. Although seemingly simple, commentators describe this amendment as possibly one of the most economically significant provisions in the Code because of the harsh standard it
sets.' Although the Treasury may argue that "commensurate with in1. I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
2. Id.
3. Section 482:Statutes and Regulations, 115-4th Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-72(4) (1987).
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come" is the arm's length standard, the new standard can in reality be a
stricter and less favorable standard than the traditional arm's length
standard.
This Note argues that the amendment to section 482 is detrimental
to United States business interests. The amendment burdens the ability
of United States corporations to compete internationally because it subjects them to higher taxes and double taxation. This amendment also
discourages businesses from taking advantage of lower labor and material costs abroad. Additionally, this amendment causes uncertainty because it imposes a standard based on unknown future income.
The philosophy underlying a nation's taxing policy influences the
success of its businesses. The success of Japan's economy over the past
few decades can be attributed partially to its taxing policy.4 Japan recently enacted a statute similar to section 482 which is based on an arm's
length standard.5 Although the purpose of both Japan's statute and Section 482 is to prevent abuse, the philosophy of the Japanese taxing authority is quite different from that of the United States. Japan's policy
emphasizes alleviation of taxpayer uncertainty because these uncertainties can be an economic burden on its businesses. Japan's philosophy
contrasts with that of the United States which is unconcerned with the
uncertainties a new standard can impose on taxpayers. The United
States can learn from Japan that alleviating the burden of uncertainty
can help the success of its businesses and, in turn, the success of the
nation's economy.
Because the amendment is directed toward intangibles, this Note
examines the particular effect the amendment has on United States businesses' ability to compete internationally in the high technology industry.
A competitive high technology industry is important to the future United
States economy. An underlying effect of the amendment is to discourage
transfers of intangibles abroad because of the uncertain tax consequences
associated with the transfer. Japan, in contrast to the United States, encourages its industries to invest abroad. The United States attempt to
prevent tax abuse may backfire and reduce tax revenue because the
amendment will make these corporations less profitable.
Finally, this Note discusses the importance of a universal pricing
standard. Section 482 primarily affects multinational corporations. The
involvement of foreign countries adds to the complexity of section 482 by
4. JapaneseTax Policy: HearingBefore the Joint Economic Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess.

1-2, 9 (1984) (statement of Representative Lundgren).
5. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, Japan'sNew Intercompany Pricing Rules in Light of SecTAX MGMT. INT'L J.,Oct. 10, 1986, at 373.

tion 482,
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subjecting corporations to foreign tax laws and presenting a risk of
double taxation. The growing economic interdependence between countries brings with it the need for procedures to prevent this potential tax
burden. To alleviate part of the burden, many trading nations have attempted to institute a universal arm's length standard.' The standard in
the section 482 amendment deviates from an arm's length standard and
hinders the attempt to establish this universal standard.
II.
A.

INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 482

Introduction

Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted in 1928.1 It
gives the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to "distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income [and] deduction ...among [related taxpayers] if ... necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to
reflect the income.
...
8 This provision significantly affects multinational corporations and has been the subject of much controversy.
Although section 482 applies to both tangibles and intangibles, this Note
addresses intangibles because the recent amendment only applies to intangibles. Transfers of tangibles are still measured by the arm's length
standard. 9
The principal purpose of section 482 is to prevent tax evasion by
United States taxpayers who could shift income from activities in the
United States to foreign countries where taxes were lower.10 A common
way to shift income is to transfer intangibles1 1 developed or acquired by a
United States parent company to a foreign subsidiary for manufacturing
or sales.2 This results in a disproportionate share of the profit taxed to
the subsidiary and less tax revenue for the United States.13 Besides the
possible advantage of lower taxes in the foreign country, businesses may
also have the advantages of lower labor and material costs, and possibly
6. Granwell & Hirsh, The Super Royalty: A New InternationalTax Concept, 33 TAX
NOTES 1049 (1986).
7. Kragen, Avoidance ofInternationalDouble Taxation Arising From Section 482 Allocation, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1493, 1495 (1972).
8. I.R.C. § 482 (1986). "Related taxpayers" is defined as two or more entities "owned or
controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests.. . ." Id.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2 (1988).
10. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 2 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) No. 986, at 68:1 (1987).
11. Intangible property includes patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, copyrights, literary, musical or artistic compositions, trademarks, franchises, licenses, systems, and
technical data. I.R.C. § 936(h)(3)(B) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 482-2(d)(3)(ii)(a)-(e) (1988).
12. Section 482: Statutes and Regulations, 115-3rd Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-70 (1982).
13. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:1.
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fewer regulations.1 4
Prior to 1961, the United States tax policy encouraged investments
in foreign countries.15 Due to an increasing trade deficit, however, Congress became concerned with the flow of capital out of the United
States.16 Enforcement of section 482 was considered a way to discourage
foreign investment by United States corporations, taking away the tax
advantages available to multinational companies by shifting income and
deductions between the related entities.17
To comply with section 482, a United States entity which transfers
property (including intangibles) to a related foreign entity must include
as income a reasonable charge for that property, even though little or no
payment is actually made.18 Prior to the 1986 amendment, an arm's
length standard determined the reasonable charge for intangibles.' 9 An
arm's length price is that which unrelated persons would have agreed to
in an identical or similar transaction.20 The arm's length standard may
be easier to apply than other methods because it is objectively based on
statistics from corporations similarily situated.2
Another method of determining price in transactions between related entities is the "unitary" method. This method uses profits as the
primary factor for determining price.2 2 This pricing method is difficult
to apply because it is vague and not flexible enough to take into account
other relevant factors. 23 The "unitary" method is similar in many respects to the "commensurate with income" standard used in the section
482 amendment because they both rely on future income to determine
price.
B.

1986 Amendment to Section 482
1. General
In order to deter foreign investment and tax avoidance, the 1986
14. Id. at 68:8.
15.

Kragen, supra note 7, at 1495.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. EXPLANATION OF TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 11931, at 524 (CCH 1986); Wright &
Clowery, The Super Royalty: A Suggested Regulatory Approach, 36 TAx NoTas 429 (1987).
19. Id.
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2) (1988); see also The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note
10, at 68:2; Section 482: Statutes and Regulations, supra note 12, at A-68; Granwell & Hirsh,
supra note 6, at 1040.

21. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:2.
22. Id. at 68:1-2.

23. Id.
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Tax Reform Act [hereinafter 1986 TRA] amended section 482 by adding
the phrase, "[I]n the case of any transfer... of intangible property...
the income with respect to such transfer or license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible."'2 4 The amendment
applies to all entities within the scope of section 482. It includes transfers by a United States entity to a foreign affiliate, by one foreign affiliate
to a second foreign affiliate, and by a foreign entity to a related United
States entity.2 5
Prior to the 1986 TRA, the arm's length standard was used for intangibles.2 6 Under the Treasury Regulations, it was the permissible
method for making allocations for intangibles. 27 Generally an arm's
length price is determined by finding similar transactions between unrelated parties and applying these prices to related parties. 28 Intangibles,
however, present a problem because it is difficult to find an appropriate
comparison to determine the terms of an arm's length transaction. Often
intangible properties are unique in nature and have little relationship to
their cost.29 The controversial portion of the amendment is the phrase
"commensurate with the income attributable to the intangibles."
Although the Treasury argues otherwise, this phrase abandons the traditional arm's length standard and replaces it with a new "commensurate
with income" standard.30 Previously, in an international transaction, the
arm's length standard was determined as of the time of the agreement
and, unless stated otherwise, no adjustment was permitted for changed
circumstances. 3 Case law and commercial practice did not allow re-determination of the arm's length price because of a change in
24. Tax Reform Bill of 1986, 73 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCII) No. 41, § 1231(e)(1) (Sept.
21, 1986).
25. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-637 (1986), reprintedin Tax Reform Bill of 1986,supra note 24, at 11-637; see also The Tax Reform Act of 1986,supra note 10,
at 68:5; Section 482: Statutes and Regulations,supra note 3, at A-72(2); Granwell & Hirsh,
supra note 6, at 1042.
26. Section 482: Statutes and Regulations,supra note 12, at A-67.
27. Iai The Treasury Regulations list 13 factors to determine "arm's length" when there
is no sufficiently similar transaction on which it can be based. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-2(d)(2)(iii)
(1988), discussed in Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1040.
28. Section 482: Statutes and Regulations, supra note 12, at A-68.

29. Id. at A-67.
30. EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, supra note 18, at 524-25; Wright
& Clowery, supra note 18, at 429.
31. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:5; see, eg., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 30 (1986); French v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 836 (1973). But see, eg.,
Nestle Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 46 (1963) (adjustment allowed because unrelated parties would have renegotiated the agreement).
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circumstances.3 2
2.

Congressional Intent

The intent of Congress in passing the amendment was to change the
pricing standard to give less leeway to taxpayers and more control to the
IRS than was made possible by the arm's length standard.3 3 A House
Ways and Means Committee report reflected this intent when it stated
that the determination of appropriate compensation was not limited to
"the facts in existence at the time of the transfer." 34 The Committee
stated that "actual profit experience realized as a consequence of the
transfer" should also be considered.3 5 Further, the Committee wrote
that these provisions should be applied with hindsight and "payments
made for the intangible adjusted over time to reflect changes in the income attributable to the intangible" when there are major variations.3 6
According to the House Report, it was insufficient to consider evidence
only at the time of the transfer. 37 The Report further stated that primary
weight must be given to "the profit or income stream generated by...
[the] intangible.",31 In contrast, an arm's length price is based on what
unrelated parties would do under similar circumstances. Unrelated parties generally do not allow the selling price to change because profits are
different than anticipated at the time of the sale.
Congress amended section 482 because it believed that the regulation had not assured an adequate allocation of income to United States
32. Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1044.
33. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH

CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (H.R. 3838, 99TH CONG.; PUBLIC LAW 99-14) at 1013-15

(Joint Comm. Print 1987), reprinted in 74 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 19, at 1013-15
(May 8, 1987); H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 425 (1985), reprintedin Tax Reform
Bill of 1985, 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, at 425 (Dec. 10, 1985), discussedin The
Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:5-6.
34. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 1016, reprintedin 74 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 19, supra note 33, at 1016; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 33, at
425, reprinted in 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, supra note 33, at 425.
35. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 1016, reprintedin 74 Stand.

Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 19, supra note 33, at 1016; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 33, at
425, reprinted in 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, supra note 33, at 425.
36. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 1016, reprintedin 74 Stand.

Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 19, supra note 33, at 1016; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 33, at
425-26, reprinted in 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, supra note 33, at 425-26.
37. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 1016, reprintedin 74 Stand.

Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 19, supra note 33, at 1016; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 33, at
425-26, reprinted in 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, supra note 33, at 425-26.
38. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 1016, reprinted in 74 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 19, supra note 33, at 1016; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 33, at
426, reprinted in 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, supra note 33, at 426.
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taxpayers from intangibles transferred to related foreign entities.3 9 Of
particular concern were intangibles with an unusually high profit potential because more income potentially escaped United States taxes, and
because it was more difficult to establish an arm's length price." Companies could sell the intangible to a foreign affiliate early for a lower than
market royalty or use industry norms of less profitable items."' This resulted in a corporation's ability to transfer profits from the intangible to a
country with lower tax rates. This procedure was particularly efficient
when the income was high relative to the manufacturing costs. 42 Because
a deduction for research and development expenses was allowed in the
43
United States, the United States suffered losses of tax revenues.
Congress was also concerned with the difficulty of finding comparable prices for high profit intangibles and the inconsistency of price adjustments under the arm's length standard due to this lack of comparable
prices.' High profit intangibles lack comparables because generally intangibles are unique and are not transferred to unrelated parties. 4 5 However, even if it was difficult to find comparables for intangibles, it was
unnecessarily extreme to make future profits a requirement for measuring income. Also, because the primary Congressional concern was with a
few, high profit intangibles, this harsh standard should not apply to all

intangibles.
Another underlying concern of Congress was the effect of transferring intangibles abroad on employment in the United States and the
trade deficit.46 Intangible products help create jobs and export income,
39. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 33, at 423, reprinted in 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep.
(CCH) No. 53, supra note 33, at 423. "Many observers have questioned the effectiveness of the
'arm's length approach'.. . under § 482." Id., discussedin The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra
note 10, at 68:3; Section 482: Statutes and Regulations,supra note 3, at A-72.
40. STAFF OF JoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 1014, reprintedin 74 Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 19, supra note 33, at 1014; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 33, at
423, reprintedin 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCHI) No. 53, supra note 33, at 423, discussedin
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:3.
41. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 1014, reprintedin 74 Stand.

Fed. Tax Rep. (CCII) No. 19, supra note 33, at 1014; H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 33, at
424-25, reprintedin 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCII) No. 53, supra note 33, at 424-25.
42. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 33, at 1013-14, reprinted in 74

Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 19, supra note 33, at 1013-14; H.R. REP.No. 426, supra note
33, at 423, reprintedin 72 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 53, supra note 33, at 423.
43. Section 482: Statutes & Regulations, supra note 3, at A-72; The Tax Reform Act of
1986, supra note 10, at 68:3; Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1039 n.8.
44. Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1038.
45. Sec. 482 White Paperon Intercompany Pricing, Treas. Dept. Rep. (CCH) No. 53, at
47-48 (Oct. 20, 1988) [hereinafter White Paper].
46. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:3.
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both of which were lost if the intangibles were transferred abroad.4 7 The
trade deficit also increased when the products of these intangibles were
imported back to the United States.4" Therefore, Congress may have attempted to discourage the use of intangibles abroad.4 9 However, increasing the tax burden might not have a positive effect on the trade deficit
and employment. Such tax increases could hamper the future of the
United States economy because businesses may be unable to successfully
compete in the international market.
3.

Comments from the Treasury Department

The amendment to section 482 has raised many questions. These
questions led Congress to recommend that the Treasury Department
conduct a study to investigate a modification of the regulation." The
Treasury Department's report, entitled Section 482 White Paper on Intercompany Pricing [hereinafter White Paper],51 suggested that the
amount of income from transferred intangibles should be given primary
weight in determining the price.5 2 The report also suggested that economic contributions and risk taking factors must be considered in determining the price.5 3 The White Paper stated that the goal of the
"commensurate with income" standard is to determine price in the same
manner as unrelated parties would determine price in an arm's length
transaction. 4 However, the Treasury's statements are true only if all
contract terms are based on actual profits and adjustments are made for
substantial changes in income. 5
Despite the Treasury Department's statements, the general discretion allowed IRS auditors in their determination of whether a taxpayer
has met the standard significantly affects the taxpayer's ultimate fate.5 6
47. Id.
48. Section 482: Statutes and Regulations, supra note 3, at A-72(4).
49. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:3; Section 482: Statutes andRegulations, supra note 3, at A-72.
50. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, supra note 25, at 11-638, reprintedin Tax Reform Bill of
1986, supra note 24, at 11-638, discussedin Section 482: Statutes and Regulations,supra note 3,
at A-72(2).
51. White Paper,supra note 45, at 47-55.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. In a Treasury proposal prior to the enactment of the amendment, the Department
stated that the arm's length standard should continue. However, "the computation... must
take into account, as a relevant factor, the annual income stream from the intangibles."
Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1038.
56. Wright & Clowery, supra note 18, at 431.
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Some agents believe that all overseas production should be subject to the
new amendment, and other agents react differently. 7 IRS agents have
much discretion in determining the action they want to take. Once an
agent determines an adjustment the taxpayer has the burden of proving
that the IRS abused its discretion.5 8 The taxpayer must show that the
adjustment is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable."5 9 This is a
greater burden than is usually applied in tax controversies and is a very
difficult burden to meet.' The uncertainty of the new provision allows
for arbitrary decisions by IRS agents and opens the door to potentially
large and unwarranted adjustments.
4.

Comments from the Business Community,

The business community responded with concern to the shift away
from the traditional arm's length standard. One concern is that the
amendment allows the IRS to use hindsight in determining the income
attributable to the intangible.6 1 "This approach contrasts sharply with
the current arm's length approach of determining income based only on
facts known at the time of the transfer."'6 2 Another concern is that Congress created a new standard for intangibles without regard to whether
the royalty is considered an arm's length price under Treasury Regulation section 1.482-2(d). 3 This Treasury Regulation provides the factors
traditionally used to determine arm's length pricefr4 The amendment is
described by one commentator as an extremely harsh and severe method
to ensure adequate allocation of income to the United States.6 5
C. Economic Effects of the Amendment
1. Double Taxation
Double taxation occurs when a section 482 adjustment is made by
the United States and a correlative adjustment is not made by foreign tax
57. Id.
58. Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1047.
59. Id (quoting Pauline W. Arch, 42 T.C. 114, 125-26 (1964), aff'd, 358 F.2d 342 (6th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 899 (1966)).
60. Id.
61. Wright & Clowery, supra note 18, at 429, 434. "The 'look-back' feature of the super
royalty provisions introduces more uncertainty into a process already fraught with ambiguity."

Id. at 436.
62. Id. at 429, 434.
63. Section 482: Statutes and Regulations, supra note 3, at A-72.
64. Id.
65. Benson, Transfers of Intangibles to Related Parties Outside the United States Under
H.R. 3838, TAx MGMT. J., Feb. 14, 1986, at 64.
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authorities.6 6 The United States will make an adjustment attributing
more of the income from the intangible to the United States entity. The
United States company is taxed for this additional income. If the foreign
country does not make a corresponding adjustment to reduce the income
attributable to the foreign affiliate, the affiliate is taxed on the same income.67 There is no legal obligation for a foreign country to make a
correlative adjustment for a United States corporation.6 8 Section 482 adjustments create problems because the adjustment is usually an after-thefact adjustment. 69 The United States tax is levied after the foreign tax
has been paid, and most countries often will not, or cannot, give a refund.7"
Double taxation lessens the competitive position of American
businesses because of the additional taxes and uncertainty it imposes.7 1
2.

Other Burdensome Uncertainties and Additional Costs

The amendment to section 482 creates burdensome uncertainties in
the taxing structure and additional costs for items such as litigation,72
record keeping, and reporting. 73 Using the arm's length method, an IRS
agent had broad discretion in proposing adjustments and reasonable efforts by the taxpayer to comply with the standard did not assure that an
adjustment would not be made.7 4 The new standard only adds to this
uncertainty. As previously noted, the burden of showing the agent acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and unreasonably is difficult to meet. 75 Therefore, the commensurate with income standard places a more difficult burden on related taxpayers than on unrelated parties.7 6
The new amendment does not provide a safe harbor range for intangibles. If a taxpayer falls within the limits set by a safe harbor, the
price will not be questioned by the IRS. Without these safe harbors, the
determination of income is subject to differing interpretations by various
IRS agents.77
The amendment places additional burdens on related parties as
66. Section 482: Special Problems, 116 Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-39 (1983).

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Kragen, supra note 7, at 1497-98.
70. Id.
71. See generally Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1051.
72. Id. at 1046.
73. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:8.
74. Section 482: Statutes and Regulations, supra note 12, at A-68.
75. Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1047.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1040; Wright & Clowery, supra note 18, at 431. There are safe harbors for other
provisions covered by section 482. Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1040.
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compared to unrelated parties. This makes it difficult to compete both
domestically and internationally.
3.

Negative Impact on Competitiveness

In the United States there is a growing concern that American industries lack competitiveness.7 8 It is important to increase the ability of
United States corporations to compete in areas that require development
and application of advanced technologies.7 9 The future prosperity of the
United States economy may depend on the ability to develop its high
technology industries.80 Because intangibles are valuable components in
high technology products, any change of the treatment of intangibles directly affects high technology industries.8 " In the past, the United States
tax policy rewarded capital-intensive industries and penalized knowledge-intensive, high technology sectors.8 2 In the 1970s, the average effective corporate tax rate of a high technology company was significantly
higher than that of a manufacturing operation.8" Income generated from
intangible assets may be taxed at a higher marginal effective rate which
directly impacts the high technology industry because of the additional
84
costs.
Because the tax structure discourages investment in foreign countries, United States businesses are unable to take advantage of cheaper
labor and materials and the less strict regulatory conditions of foreign
countries. 85 This competitive disadvantage dampens the incentive to exploit high technology markets, particularly when competing foreign industries utilize these advantages. 86
Although the amendment to section 482 may raise revenues in the
short term, it does not consider the long term effect on the ability of
United States businesses to compete.
78. Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1051.
79. Id
80. Hulten & Robertson, The Taxation of High Technology Industries, NAT'L TAx J.,
Sept. 1984, at 327.
81. Cordes, Watson, & Hauger, Effects of Tax Reform on High Technology Firms, NAT'L

TAX J., Sept. 1987, at 375.
82. Hulton & Robertson, supra note 80, at 327.
83. Id
84. Id at 334.
85. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:8.
86. Section 482: Statutes and Regulations,supra note 3, at A-72(3)-(4); The Tax Reform
Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:7.
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Possible Relief from Negative Economic Effect

Double taxation is a major economic concern caused by the amendment. There are procedures under the Competent Authority [hereinafter
CA] and tax treaties to eliminate or mitigate this burden.87
The CA is responsible for negotiating tax disputes for United States
taxpayers with foreign countries.8 8 Most trading countries have a CA or
a similar position.8 9 However, whether the CA or treaties can effectively
provide relief from adjustment based on the section 482 amendment and
eliminate the double taxation problem is questionable.
1. General Information on Tax Treaties and the Competent
Authority
Most tax treaties, including those signed by the United States, include provisions granting authority to the CA, or its counterpart, to
make adjustments to taxable income to reflect arm's length terms.9 0 The
CAs of each country confer and reach a mutual agreement on price.9
Treaties do not, however, supercede the relevant tax law of the respective
countries.9 2 Generally, a country will only make correlative adjustments
if it believes that the profits reflect an arm's length transaction. 93 If one
country proposes an adjustment, there is no automatic claim for a refund
or credit from the other participating country.9 4 Although most treaties
provide that when two countries disagree they "shall endeavor to reach
agreement" in accordance with procedures in the treaty, there is no re87. See generally Liebman, The Practiceand Procedureof Competent Authority: Seeking
Relief From Double Taxation under BilateralTax Treaties, 58 TAXES 363 (1980). The United
States Competent Authority generally consists of the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegates. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Section 482: Special Problems, supra note 66, at A-43. This is found in the Mutual
Agreement Procedure section of all United States income tax treaties except the treaty with
Ireland. Bodner, InternationalTaxation: Competent AuthoritiesShare Their Concerns, 32 TAX
NOTES 573-74 (1986).
91. Section 482: Special Problems, supra note 66, at A-45.
92. Id. at A-43.
93. Id. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [hereinafter
OECD] Committee on Fiscal Affairs, in its 1979 report, Transfer Pricingand Multinational
Enterprises,adopts the arm's length method as the "sole acceptable method for making adjustments" and "rejects the unitary method as unacceptably arbitrary and productive of double
taxation." Id. Each country has its own statute of limitations which must be considered. Id.
at A-45. Each country has its own Competent Authority procedures which must be followed
before an adjustment will be made. Id. at A-43.
94. Id. at A-49.
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quirement that an agreement be reached in every case. 95
2.

United States Competent Authority Procedures

In the United States the CA is the exclusive source for a United
States corporation to get a credit or refund if a foreign country is involved in a tax matter.96 A decision by the CA is "final and not subject
to judicial review." 97 The CA can also instruct the IRS to forego a pro-

posed section 482 adjustment if it is unwarranted by the law or the facts
or if the adjustment is de minimis. 9 s Thus, the CA plays a significant
role when a section 482 adjustment is made.
Revenue Procedure 82-79 provides guidelines for a taxpayer to request assistance from the CA when the IRS imposes a section 482 adjustment. 99 The section 482 amendment would override this revenue
procedure. The Revenue Procedure states that the CA "will be guided
by the standard of arm's length dealing."' " Abiding by this revenue
procedure, the CA uses the arm's length standard in its dealings with
foreign countries. Applying a different standard (when the arm's length
standard has been accepted by foreign countries) would lead to confusion
and acceptance of the new standard by other countries is uncertain.
3. Drawbacks to Tax Treaties and Competent Authority Relief
The section 482 amendment may not be in accordance with the
United States tax treaties.1"' If true, neither the tax treaties nor the CA.
95. Id. at A44.
96. kd at A-50 n.201. For additional information on procedures to be used in the United
States if the IRS proposes an adjustment, see id. at A-50 to -53.
97. Kragen, supra note 7, at 1513.
98. Schuster & Fichtenholz, Competent Authority Cases: A PracticalApproach to Relief
from Double Taxation, J. TAX'N, Nov. 1977, at 293; see also Kragen, supra note 7, at 1510
(The United States is trying to give more authorization to the Competent Authority to settle
double taxation issues in new tax treaties).
99. Rev. Proc. 82-29, 1982-1 C.B. 480, discussed in Section 482: Special Problems,supra
note 66, at A-45. Procedures were originally outlined in Rev. Proc. 70-18 which was
superceded by Rev. Proc. 82-29. Id. at A-47; see also Rev. Proc. 70-18, 1970-2 C.B. 493;
Kragen, supra note 7, at 1512-13 (Additional information on the strict rules to be followed to
get Competent Authority relief). This procedure only applies if there is a treaty with the
foreign country. Id Taxpayers must tentatively agree with adjustment before going to the
Competent Authority. Schuster & Fichtenholz, supra note 98, at 289.
100. Section 482: SpecialProblems,supra note 66, at A-47. When the General Accounting
Office recommended using a specific formula to be applied against realized income, the IRS
and Treasury Department stated that "a major objection to the use of formula apportionment
across national borders is that tax treaties between the United States and other nations specify
[an] arm's length standard.... For the United States to adopt a different method could result
in multinational corporations incurring double taxation." Id. at A-47 n.196.
101. Id.
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can remedy adjustments made for the "commensurate with income"
standard."12 Without a specific treaty provision for these adjustments,
the CA has no authority to provide relief.103 Although the United States
has tax treaties with most of its trading partners, a taxpayer cannot get
relief from the CA if the foreign entity happens to be located in a nontreaty country. 10 4

It is difficult to predict how foreign tax authorities will react to the
new standard because most other countries use an arm's length method
and have not accepted the unitary method, which is based on future profits, except as a factor in determining the arm's length price.10 5 Generally, a foreign country cannot make a correlative adjustment to alleviate
06
double taxation for amounts that exceed an arm's length transaction. 1
It may be unrealistic to expect that foreign countries would make such a
correlative adjustment. 107 One reason for this is that it is already difficult
to persuade local tax authorities to accept royalty rates, especially in high
technology industries in which the rates are often already excessive. 1 8
Although the CA has an affirmative duty to make reasonable efforts
to eliminate or mitigate double taxation, the duty is discretionary and
intervention cannot be compelled. 10 9 There is no available information
or statistical study on the ability of the CA to obtain relief for the taxpayer. "0 Therefore, it is uncertain whether the CA procedure effectively
provides relief. The taxpayer is left to speculate on this matter."' The
uncertainty of getting full relief from double taxation makes it difficult
112
for those investing abroad.
102. Id. at A-44. A foreign entity may try to file for a refund with a foreign tax authority
based on an adjustment made by the United States. However, this rarely, if ever, occurs. Id.
103. Id. at A-54.
104. Schuster & Fichtenholz, supra note 98, at 288.
105. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:7; Section 482: Statutes and Regulations, supra note 3, at A-72(3).
106. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:7.
107. Id. The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs issued a report in 1979 stating that transfer prices by member states should be based on the arm's length method. Section 482: Statutes
and Regulations, supra note 3, at A-72(3). There is no reason to believe that a foreign tax
authority would accept such redetermination when it is in excess of what it considers an appropriate amount, especially if it reduces the local tax. Benson, supra note 65, at 64; Granwell &
Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1047.
108. Benson, supra note 65, at 64; Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1047-48. This has
been the case especially when adjustments are made in subsequent years. Benson, supra note
65, at 64.
109. Section 482: Special Problems, supra note 66, at A-45.
110. Id. The United States is the only country with guidelines on how to get Competent
Authority assistance. Id.
111. Id. at A-47.
112. Schuster & Fichtenholz, supra note 98, at 288.
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Due to the retroactive adjustment allowed under the amendment,
another problem arises if a foreign country's statute of limitations bars
CA relief.113 Under some treaties, if a foreign statute of limitations expires the foreign CA decision can override the statute."1 4 If the CA decision does not override the statute, the taxpayer's only hope is a United
States grant of unilateral relief. 5 However, unilateral relief is rare because most countries do not want to bear the burden of double taxation
116
alone.
E.

Overview of the Problems with the Amendment to Section 482

The problem with the amendment to section 482 is its departure
from the traditional arm's length standard. The amendment makes profits a determining factor of price in all situations, not just those situations
in which unrelated parties chose to rely on profits. Unrelated parties do
not always adjust contract terms because profits are higher or lower than
expected and do not allow for periodic adjustments because of changes in
circumstances. Despite the Treasury Department's assertions, the "commensurate with income" standard is a deviation from the arm's length
standard.
The original intent of section 482 indicates that the arm's length
method should remain the standard. The purpose of section 482 was to
put related parties on equal footing with unrelated parties by preventing
related parties from receiving tax advantages by manipulating income
and expenses. However, under the new statute, related parties are at a
disadvantage because they are subject to a hindsight test.
The new standard places additional burdens and uncertainties on
the taxpayer. It increases the possibility of double taxation, discourages
investments abroad, and puts taxpayers in the precarious position of uncertain tax consequences. The additional burden hinders the ability of
American businesses to compete internationally. The amendment will
particularly impact the high technology industry. This amendment does
not alleviate Congressional concern about the economy, the trade deficit,
and employment. Although the abuses addressed by section 482 and the
amendment should be prevented, there are alternatives which are not as
burdensome on the taxpayer.
113. Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1048 n.50.
114. Section 482. SpecialProblems, supra note 66, at A-52.
115. Id. The IRS will not grant relief if the statute of limitations has passed, even if the
foreign country does not notify the taxpayer until after expiration of the United States statute
of limitations. Id. at A-54.
116. Kragen, supra note 7, at 1516.
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Japan is also addressing the prevention of similar tax abuse, but in a
manner less burdensome to its taxpayers. In contrast to the United
States, Japan took steps to alleviate the burden of uncertainties.
III.

Japanese Taxing Policy

Japan was selected for discussion because of its success in international competition, its "ability to quickly adopt the latest technologies
and innovations," and its high economic growth rate.1 17 These successes
may be attributed, in part, to Japan's taxing and spending policy.""
Since the postwar period, Japan has cut taxes almost every year to keep
the tax burden moderate."l 9
In 1986, Japan enacted legislation similar to section 482 to prevent
the same kind of tax abuses. 12° The following sections describe the new
legislation and contrast Japan's policy in implementing the legislation
with that of the United States. Japan's policy attempts to alleviate the
taxpayers' uncertainty, recognizing that uncertainties burden Japan's
corporations and its economy.
A.

Intercompany Pricing Legislation

In March 1986, Japan passed legislation on intercompany pricing in
Article 66-5 of the Special Taxation Measures Law. 2 ' The legislation
established for the first time an arm's length standard in international
122
intercompany pricing. Previously, Japan used a "reasonableness" test.
The legislation was intended to stop the loss of tax revenues caused by
shifting of income outside Japan through international intercompany
pricing.' 23 From 1980 to 1984 the percentage of fraudulent income relating to this abuse had increased from ten percent to over thirty-five
24
percent. 1
117. Japanese Tax Policy: HearingBefore the Joint Economic Comm., supra note 4, at 1-2.
118. Id. at 1-2, 6.
119. Id. In the mid-1970s the share of gross national product represented by national and
local tax receipts was below twenty percent. Although Japan has sought to keep the tax bur-

den under twenty percent of GNP, in 1980 it was twenty-six percent which was still below the
average for OECD nations of thirty-five percent and that of the United States of thirty percent.

Id. at 1-2.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 373.
Id.
Id.
Id.

124. T. Kiribuchi, Deputy Commissioner of the National Tax Administration in Japan,
Remarks at the International Tax Institute Seminar (June 2-3, 1986) [hereinafter Kiribuchi
Remarks], reprinted in Bodner, supra note 90, at 586.
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The new Japanese legislation provides that transactions between related foreign entities which are not at arm's length prices are deemed to
be carried on at arm's length prices.125 "Related" is defined as at least
fifty percent ownership and control or the existence of a "special relationship."12' 6 A "special relationship" is defined as common officers or directors, maintaining a certain level of operating transactions between
companies, or the existence of a certain percentage of loans borrowed
from or guaranteed by the other company. 2 7 An "arm's length price" is
defined as "the price that would have been charged between two unrelated parties under similar circumstances."12' 8 The described method is
also used for intangible properties.129
The legislation provides four alternative methods to determine an
arm's length price: (1) The comparable uncontrolled price method.
Under this method the price that is paid between unrelated parties controls and an adjustment is allowed for special circumstances; (2) The
resale price method. Under this method, the normal profit margin is subtracted from the resale price that would be used for sale to an unrelated
party. The price range is based on price averages for similar products.
The company is not audited if the sale price of the product falls within
the safe harbor range. If the price is not within this range, the tax authorities will consider all the circumstances and determine the appropriate adjustment; (3) The cost plus method. This method provides for a
normal mark-up to be added to the price of the intangible. The safe harbor range also applies to this method; (4) The final provision of the statute allows individuals to suggest a pricing procedure when the other
suggested methods cannot be used. 130
These pricing methods are similar to those used in the United States
although the United States gives priority to certain methods.13 1 In contrast, Japan believes that a lack of priority allows more flexibility in es1 32
tablishing an appropriate arm's length price.
125. Business Operations in Japan, 51-7th Tax Mgmt. (BNA), at A-64 (1984).
126. Y. GoMI, GUIDE TO JAPANESE TAXES 1988-89, at 173 (1988); Sherwood, Gomi, &
Yoost, supra note 5, at 374.

127. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 376; Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124,
reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 588.
128. Business Operations in Japan, supra note 125, at A-64; Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost,
supra note 5, at 377.

129. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 379.
130. Id. at 378.
131. Y. GOMI, supra note 126, at 173; Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 377.
132. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 377; Kiribuehi Remarks, supra note 124,
reprinted in Bodner, supra note 90, at 588.
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Japan's Taxing Policies

The general policy of the Japanese taxing authorities is to balance an
effective enforcement structure with the goal of minimizing the burden
placed on the taxpayer. 133 In regard to intangibles, the burden of proving the use of an arm's length price is on the taxpayer. 134 To avoid aggressive use of the standard, Japanese tax authorities state that the
standard should be used prudently.1 35 The United States, however, retains the heavier burden of proof,136requiring a showing that the agent
acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
The Japanese also recognize that international intercompany pricing
has a substantial economic effect on its businesses. They try to neutralize
this effect on legitimate economic activities and to secure fair and reasonable tax assessments through the use of safe harbor ranges. 137 They are
also concerned with minimizing excessive and costly administrative burdens on the taxpayer.'3 8 For example, the Japanese believe that a corporation should not be "overburdened with unwarranted requests by tax
authorities for too detailed information."' 3 9 They understand that requesting corporations to obtain foreign based information is often difficult because this information is often not available."4 In response to
these concerns, Japan plans to use a confirmation system for preapproval
of corporate pricing policies. "I' Under this system, the taxpayer presents
the price he thinks is most reasonable and also states the scope of information he is willing to provide. If the taxing authorities agree with the
price, they will give the taxpayer a confirmation that the price is proper
and will not be audited in the future.' 42 This method eliminates uncertainty and reduces the number of time consuming audits. 143 In the
United States, audits and litigation have proven to be extremely time
consuming and costly.'"
Japanese authorities believe that their tax system will be more effi133. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 378.

134. Id.
135. Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124, reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 588.

136. Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1047.
137. Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124, reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 589.
138. Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124, reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 589.

139. Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124, reprinted in Bodner, supra note 90, at 588.
140. Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124, reprinted in Bodner, supra note 90, at 590.
141. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 379.
142. Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124, reprinted in Bodner, supra note 90, at 589.

143. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 378. Establishing an acceptable range of
prices also provides certainty and avoids time consuming audits. Kiribuchi Remarks, supra
note 124, reprinted in Bodner, supra note 90, at 589-90.
144. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 380.
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cient if an informal approval from taxing authorities in other countries is
also obtained.14 However, it is unlikely that binding approval can be
obtained from the IRS or taxing authorities in other countries. 4 6 The
creation of safe harbor rules and the preapproval process by Japanese
authorities demonstrate Japan's desire to minimize burdens on the
taxpayer.

14 7

Another purpose of the Japanese legislation is to protect against
United States tax authorities.1 48 Japan plans to use the legislation as a
"shield" against "overly aggressive [United States] IRS activities" when
examining United States subsidiaries of Japanese parents.14 9 The Japanese believe that having "more aggressive enforcement than other countries could increase uncertainties . . . and imposes unwarranted
administrative costs of corporate taxpayers."' 5 ° They argue that aggressive enforcement leads to lower growth in gross national product.' 51 The
Japanese recognize that uncertainties, such as those created by the section 482 amendment, will have a negative impact on their economy.
"Unlike the United States corporate income tax, Japan's corporate
income tax seeks to avoid double taxation of corporate earnings."' 5 2 According to a United States Senate Report on the Japanese Taxing Policy,
Japan's attempts to avoid double taxation is53one of the three most significant differences between the two systems.'
IV.

A.

A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND
JAPAN AS COMPETITORS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MARKET

Balance of Trade
"The United States has a sizable and chronic deficit caused primar145. Id.at 379.
146. Id.
147. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 378; Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124,

reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 590.
148. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 374; Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124,
reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 587.
149. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 374; Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124,
reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 587
150. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 374; Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124,
reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 587.
151. Sherwood, Gomi, & Yoost, supra note 5, at 374; Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124,
reprintedin Bodner, supra note 90, at 587.
152. Japanese Tax Policy. Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., supra note 4, at 4
(statement of Allen I. Mendelowitz, Associate Director, National Security and International
Affairs Division, General Accounting Office); see, e.g., Y. GoMI, supra note 126, at 130.
153. Japanese Tax Policy: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., supra note 4, at 5.
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ily by a surge in purchases of Japanese manufactured products and, to a
'
lesser extent, by a lack of growth in exports to Japan." 154
The United
States is internationally competitive in such items as food, tobacco, petroleum, medicine, lumber, textile fibers, leather, and paper.155 However,
the United States is not competitive in most manufactured products, including machinery and instruments. 156 In order to improve its trade deficit, the United States must become more competitive in the
157
manufactured products industry.
In 1984, the United States trade deficit was $33.6 billion up from
$1.2 billion in 1970. In 1984, the trade deficit with Japan alone, dating
back to 1965, accounted for thirty-four percent of the total United States
trade deficit.' 5 8 Conversely, Japan had a $21.8 billion trade surplus with
all trading countries in 1983 and an $18.6 billion surplus from trading
with the United States. 5 9 The United States trade deficit and the Japanese trade surplus indicate that Japan's businesses compete more successfully in world markets than United States businesses.
B.

The High Technology Market

The United States and Japan are competitors in the high technology
market. 60 The United States is no longer viewed as the technological
and economic giant that once dominated all other countries. 161 Japan, as
well as many newly industrialized countries, is catching up to the United
States in this market.' 6 2 This increased competition reduces the United
States market share, thereby negatively impacting the United States balance of trade. In order for the United States to improve its trade deficit,
it is important for the United States to maintain its share of the high
technology market.
In technology sales and investments, the United States and Japan
are direct competitors in Asia and the developing countries. 63 Asian
buyers are increasingly interested in advanced technology products.' 64
154.
TRADE
155.
156.
157.

158.
159.
160.
161.

STAFF OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 99TH CONG.,

lST SESS.,

WITH THE UNITED STATES 24 (Comm. Print 1985).
Id. at 24, 28.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 26.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 33.
Id.at 34.

162. Id.

163. Id. at 114, 122.
164. Id.

JAPAN'S ECONOMY AND
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Japan's technological exports to Asia are double those of the United
States. 6 Additionally, Japanese exports are now directed strongly toward developing countries.16 6 Japan is focusing on foreign investment
opportunities and observing overseas developments to identify and de167
velop future markets.
It is a significant advantage if technology businesses can reduce costs
by manufacturing goods in foreign countries.1 68 Japanese exports are
strong in the steel and construction industries because Japan utilizes the
less expensive labor costs of foreign countries and cuts its overall costs. 169
Unlike the United States, Japanese labor has not lobbied strongly
against the exportation of technology.17 "This is due in large part to the
Japanese employment system and to union organizations that are
strongly company-centered." 171 The Japanese are not afraid that exporting products also means exporting jobs because unemployment has not
been a major problem in Japan.1 72 Japan, therefore, has an advantage
over the United States in its favorable labor situation.
An example of this problem in the high technology industry is noted
in the report on Tax Reform Proposals submitted by the semiconductor
industry to the Joint Economic Committee. 171 In this 1985 report, the
semiconductor industry addressed previous tax reforms that had a negative impact on the high technology industry. Their comments are still
relevant because the report discussed the same concerns expressed in this
Note.
In its report, the industry expressed its belief that investment levels
must continue to grow if the semiconductor industry is to remain competitive with Japanese and other foreign companies. Investments are
particularly necessary in a market where products and technologies
change every two to three years and foreign governments offer major
incentives to their companies. 174 The United States tax laws have a sub165. Id. at 114.
166. Id. at 116-17.
167. Id. at 123.
168. Id. at 125.
169. Id at 118.
170. Id. at 127.
171. Id
172. Id Japan gives preferential tax treatment to exporters of technology and technical
services. Id at 128.
173. Impact of Unfair Foreign Trade Practices:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Economic
Goals andIntergovernmentalPolicy of the Joint Economic Comm., 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
The semiconductor industry invests in research and development at a rate higher than virtually any other industry in the United States. Id. at 95.
174. Id.
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stantial impact on the ability of high technology companies to compete
internationally.1 75 Various tax reforms have limited the ability of United
States companies to compete. 1 76 The report states that "at a time of a
record trade deficit" such tax reforms are "ill-advised" because they put
United States companies at a clear and distinct disadvantage compared
to foreign competitors.' 1 7 The industry report also notes that "tax
changes in the international area must be balanced by considerations for
the competitiveness of U.S. exporters and U.S. companies operating
abroad."' 78 The concerns expressed by the semiconductor industry are
still concerns that plague United States businesses. It is also apparent
that the United States is still passing tax reform legislation that puts its
businesses at a competitive disadvantage.
Although Japan is faced with the same potential tax abuse by its
corporations as is the United States, Japan provides a means to eliminate
some of the tax burden on its corporations. Alleviating tax burdens
strengthens the competitiveness of its businesses. Japan's policy of supporting its businesses has benefitted the Japanese economy as evidenced
by the success of its businesses and Japan's healthy trade surplus.
V.

UNIVERSAL STANDARD FOR TRANSFER PRICING

The international implications of the section 482 amendment and
the constant interchange between trading countries creates a need for a
universal standard. In determining its pricing standard, it is important
for a country, such as the United States, also to consider the development
of a universal standard.
The majority of the trading countries attempted to develop an international standard for all international transfer pricing.179 The internationally accepted arm's length standard meets this objective.'
Because
the "commensurate with income" standard deviates from an arms length
standard, it is detrimental to the establishment of universal transfer pricing rules. 181
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
[hereinafter OECD] has studied the problems associated with double tax175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Granwell & Hirsh, supra note 6, at 1049.
Id.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986, supra note 10, at 68:7.
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ation and the negative impact they have on international transactions182
The OECD recommended the following standard for international transfer pricing: income "shall be computed on the basis of [the entity] being
a 'distinct and separate enterprise engaged in the same or similar conditions and dealing wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is
a permanent establishment.' ,183 The report also states that 84profits
should be only one factor in determining an arm's length price.1
Most United States treaties use language similar to the following in
the standard for international transfer pricing: "an independent and separate enterprise dealing with an unrelated entity."' 8 5 This language demonstrates the historical use of an arm's length standard rather than a
standard that allows adjustments based on future income.
In 1986, the International Tax Institute held a seminar to discuss
the problems of international taxation. The seminar featured the Competent Authorities of six of the most active trading countries. 18 6 One
widely discussed conclusion was that "It]he arm's length principle should
be the international standard .... Nations should avoid imposing national solutions. Most importantly ...[the] unitary methods should be
eschewed." 18' 7 The CAs recognized the increasing importance of intangibles in world trade. They warned that the valuation of intangibles is
an issue which could create instability, particularly with the increasing
importance of intangibles in world trade.'8 8 The CAs urged that the
arm's length price should be based on outside evidence or margins of
similar products adjusted to reasonably comparable prices.' 89 The CAs
noted that because the determination of an arm's length price is subjective, procedures must be adopted to minimize arbitrariness and maximize
predictability. 9 ' Furthermore, the CAs stated that countries should
"subordinate the national need for that extra measure of tax revenue to
the legitimate allocation of income" by multinational corporations. 91
Participants at the seminar unanimously recognized that business
concerns, particularly competition, must be considered in determining
182. Kragen, Double Income Taxation Treaties. The OECD Draft, 52 CALIF. L. REV. 307-

08 (1964).
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Kragen, supra note 7, at 1501-02.
Ia
Id
Bodner, supra note 90, at 573.
d at 604.
Id at 604-05.
Id at 604.
Id.
Id. at 605.
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prices for products. These concerns rather than the potential tax
problems associated with international business must guide the determination.192 The arm's length method has become a universal standard.
The importance of its continued use has been expressed by the CAs of
the major trading nations.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The section 482 amendment, with its new "commensurate with income" standard, poses several problems for the United States taxpayer
with business interests abroad. The new standard deviates from the
traditional, internationally preferred arm's length standard which puts
related parties on equal footing with unrelated parties. The new "commensurate with income" standard may subject corporations to double
taxation and create unnecessary uncertainty and cost. Unfortunately,
the end result may not achieve the expressed congressional objective of
increased tax revenues. Instead, this standard may decrease revenues
due to its negative impact on the ability of the United States to compete
abroad and earn profits.
This Note proposes that the United States continue to use the traditional arm's length method for determining international transfer pricing
for intangibles. If applicable to an arm's length transaction, the "commensurate with income" criteria should be one factor in the determination of an appropriate transfer price. However, income should not be
solely determinative, as currently required by the statute. The price
should not be adjusted because future income is not as anticipated unless
unrelated parties would so agree. The purpose of the section 482 amendment is to prevent the manipulation of income and expenses between related entities. The standard, therefore, should reflect what unrelated
parties would do.
Congress adopted this new standard to capture the unusually high
profit potential of unique intangibles. Currently, the "commensurate
with income" standard applies to all intangibles. This is an unnecessarily
broad policy to address the government's concern. As an alternative solution, the new standard could apply to only those intangibles that produce unexpected and unusually high profits. This directs the
amendment's impact to the problem areas. The government should only
adjust the price if the unexpected future profits exceed an established
threshhold. This threshhold could be based on a percent increase or a
fixed dollar amount.
192. Id.
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Commentators credit Japan's economic success, in part, to its taxing
policy. 193 Japanese taxing authorities emphasize the reduction of uncertainty in the tax structure and the avoidance of corporate double taxation.194 The Japanese policies provide more security and encouragement
to corporations to expand their foreign investments. United States corporations would also benefit from less uncertainty and should be encouraged to take advantage of opportunities abroad. In order for United
States businesses to compete internationally, the United States should
learn from Japan and help rather than hinder its businesses.
The United States tax policy should reduce some of the uncertainty
created by the section 482 amendment. One method is to delete the
"commensurate with income" standard from the statute. Potential future income could be included as a factor under the Treasury Regulations. Another suggestion is to provide a safe harbor range, as the
Japanese have provided, within which a taxpayer would not be audited.
If the United States is unwilling to provide a safe harbor range, then a
system in which the taxpayer can obtain preapproval of the price by the
IRS should be provided. A safe harbor range or a preapproval system
would eliminate the fear of a future section 482 adjustment.

VII.

CONCLUSION

This Note only touches on the complex areas of international trade
and competition and the effect that the tax system has on them. There
are obviously many factors not discussed here that substantially affect
international business.
Section 482 is one item that influences international business.
Although the new standard does not, by itself, render United States businesses uncompetitive, it does represent an attitude that disregards the
potentially damaging effect of a vague and far reaching tax burden.
It may be years before such effects are seen. If, in fact, there are
repercussions on the United States ability to compete in the area of advanced technology, the effect on the United States economy could be significant. The failure of the United States to consider the amendment's
impact upon the competitiveness of its businesses indicates that the
United States tax policy is not sufficiently integrated into the interna193. Japanese Tax Policy:Hearing Before the Joint Economic Comm., supra note 4, at 1-2,
9.
194. Id. at 4; Kiribuchi Remarks, supra note 124, reprinted in Bodner, supra note 90, at
587.
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tional economy. Before a statute is enacted, greater efforts should be
made to consider its harmful effect on American businesses.
Japan provides a sharp contrast to the United States, both in terms
of its respective transfer pricing standards, and, more importantly, its
overall philosophy of the relationship between the tax system and the
business community. It is difficult to say to what extent Japan's less aggressive tax policy and its concern for the taxpayer has influenced its
overall economic success. However, it appears that Japan's tax policy has
benefitted its high technology industry.
The United States, as a world leader, often sets standards followed
by other countries. The United States tax authorities should work in
conjunction with other countries in establishing a universal arm's length
standard.
The Treasury Department does not see the amendment to section
482 as significantly different from the arm's length standard. However,
the international business community argues that taxpayers are now subjected to a more burdensome standard that deviates from the arm's
length standard. The amendment's "commensurate with income" standard should not be a statutorily based standard, but rather only a single
factor to be considered. The assurances of the Treasury Department are
little comfort to a business planning to invest millions of dollars in an
overseas operation. If the Treasury Department wants to assist the taxpayer, a preapproval process or safe harbors would be beneficial. Without such safeguards, the uncertainties placed on the taxpayer are a
potential detriment to the future of United States international businesses
and to the United States economy.

